Constitutional Questions Raised by Montana\u27s New Income Tax Law by Hendricks, Tom
Montana Law Review 
Volume 17 
Issue 2 Spring 1956 Article 6 
January 1956 
Constitutional Questions Raised by Montana's New Income Tax 
Law 
Tom Hendricks 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Tom Hendricks, Constitutional Questions Raised by Montana's New Income Tax Law, 17 Mont. L. Rev. 
(1955). 
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol17/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
of decency." We have pointed out the difficulties attendant to defining
"the primary requirements of decency," and of phrasing statutes to
specifically apply only to pictures which are inimical to the public wel-
fare or public morals. As a practical matter, such a state of perfection
may never be reached, but until it is, it seems likely that the Supreme
Court will continue to prohibit the prior censorship of moving pictures.
EUGENE C. TIDBALL
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY
MONTANA'S NEW INCOME TAX LAW
The 1955 amendments to the income tax laws of the State of Montana
pose interesting problems of constitutionality.
Section 84-4905' now reads in part: "Adjusted gross income shall be
the taxpayer's gross income as defined in section 62 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 or as that section shall be labeled or amended. . . ." In a
similar manner the deductions from gross income for determining adjusted
gross income under the federal code are incorporated into the Montana law
by reference to the appropriate section number of the federal code."
Although there are some state not permitting the practice,' the majority
of American jurisdictions, including Montana,' regard incorporation by
reference as an acceptable procedure when the purpose is to pass a law
similar to one that is already in existence in another jurisdiction. This is
not considered to be a delegation of legislative power.' But when an attempt
is made to incorporate into a statute a foreign law as it now appears on the
statute books of the foreign jurisdiction, together with changes thereafter
to be made, the lawmakers are walking on uneasy ground.
Two questions are raised by the Montana amendment which this paper
will consider, namely:
1. Does that part of Section 84-4905, supra, which reads "as that Sec-
tion shall be labeled or amended," render the statute void as an unconstitu-
tional attempt to delegate legislative power to the federal government, by
including future amendments by the United States Congress in the laws of
the State of Montana?
'This section supersedes §§ 84-4906 and 84-4907, REvismri CODES OF MONTANA (1947).
The amended law also includes interest on all state, county, and municipal bonds,
which are not taxed by the federal government. Interest on United States obliga-
tions and dividends on national banks situated in Montana are excluded from the
state tax.
2REv. CODES OF MONT. § 84-4906 states: In computing net income, there shall be al-
lowed as deductions:
(a) The items referred to in §§ 161 and 211 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
or as §§ 161 and 211 shall be labeled or amended, except that state income tax
paid shall not be deductible and also subject to exceptions provided in §
84-4909, relating to items not deductible.
(b) Federal income tax paid within the taxable year. (Note: § 84-4909, supra,
excludes personal expenses, building and property improvements, and pre-
miums on life insurance policies, where taxpayer is a beneficiary.)
3For example, New York: N. Y. Const. Art. III § 17 states: "No act shall be passed
which shall provide that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be made or
deemed a part of said act, or shall enact that any existing law or part thereof, shall
be applicable, except by inserting it in such act."
'State v. District Court, 83 Mont. 400, 272 Pac. 525 (1928).
5Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E, 58, 70 A.L,R. 449 (1930).
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2. If the aforementioned portion of the laws is invalid, will the re-
mainder of the law stand?
In the majority of state constitutions, the legislative branch of the state
government is not specifically forbidden to delegate its power, but the doc-
trine that the essential legislative powers cannot be delegated, is generally
upheld by the courts.' Montana has an express prohibition in the constitu-
tion against the delegation or usurpation of the powers of one department
by another.! In only slightly varying degrees, all of the state courts follow
the doctrine of separation of powers, breathing life into the trite but ever
potent maxim, delegata potestus non patest delegari.'
But our government must be practical and workable. To require rigid
adherence to the exact word of the constitutional mandate would certainly
overburden the Legislature to the point of stagnation. It is in the light of
practicability that delegation by the Legislature to administrative bodies
and commissions has been traditionally accepted by the courts. The state-
ment of Mr. Justice Agnew in Locke's Appeal' has been reiterated with re-
sounding force in innumerable decisions throughout the states: "Congress
may not delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes
or intends to make its own action depend." It is sufficient if the lawmak-
ers set the standard and define the boundaries within which the adminis-
trative body must act.1' Such a delegation is not a delegation of essential
legislative power,' but merely an authorization to the administrative body to
"fill in the details"' in the legislation, a task which would be entirely im-
practicable for the legislature to attempt.
The delegation of a purely administrative function of a nature such
that it might be delegated to a domestic administrative body, may not be
delegated to a foreign administrative body, since such delegation would be
an impairment of state sovereignty; but it has been held that it may be dele-
gated to a federal administrative body since the federal government may
not properly be called a foreign sovereign. The states may not, however,
delegate the essential legislative functions even to the federal governmnt.'
Inasmuch as Montana has apparently not decided a case precisely in
point, let us examine a few of the leading cases of other states which have
considered the question of the adoption by a state of prospective laws of
another jurisdiction.
In a leading Maine case,' the precise question presented for decision was
whether a certain state act was valid insofar as it purported to incorporate
60pinion of the Justices, 160 Mass. 586, 36 N.E. 488 (1899).
'Art. IV, § 1 provides: "The powers of the government of this state are divided into
three distinct departments: The legislative, executive, and judicial, and no person
or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of
the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
'See Duff and Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari, A Maxim of Amer-
ican Con8titutional Law, 14 CORNE.L L. Q. 168 (1928).
'72 Pa. 491, 13 Am. Rep. 716 (1873).
1 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911).
"People ex rel Goldfogle, 242 N.Y. 277, 151 N.E. 452 (1926).
'In re Lasswell, 1 Cal. App. 2d 1&3, 36 P.2d 678 (1934).
"With regard to general question of delegability of legislative power, see 1 CooLrn,
CoNsTiTuTioNAL LINrTATroNs 224 (8th ed. 1927).
'State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 121 Me. 438, 117 Atl. 588 (1922).
[Vol. 17,
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by reference into the state law a definition of intoxicating liquors contained
in the federal law, and declaring such liquors to be intoxicating. The court
had no hesitation in striking the law down as void. Under a constitution
which vests the legislative power in a state legislature, subject only to the
initiative and referendum measures of the people, "such legislation con-
stitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and an abdication by
the representatives of the people of their power, privilege, and duty to en-
act laws."
A proposed Massachusetts statute which was to be enacted for the pur-
pose of carrying into effect, as far as the state was concerned, the Eighteenth
Amendment to the Federal constitution and which incorporated laws made
and to be made thereunder for the purpose of establishing offenses to be
punished, was held an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.'
In Holgate Bros. Company v. Bashore,' the Pennsylvania court held
that legislative power was improperly delegated by a provision of a state
statute adopting current and prospective federal standards as a basis of the
state law. The statute prescribed maximum periods of labor, and vested
power to vary the statutory schedule of hours in the State Department of
Labor and Industry. With respect to any industry whose schedule of
hours was established by federal regulation, the schedule to be fixed by the
Department of Labor and Industry should conform to the schedule estab-
lished by federal authority. The court said:
Whatever the Federal schedule now or hereafter adopted may
be, the Pennsylvania schedule "shall conform." There is no escape
from the conclusion that this language is mandatory. The result
would be, if the provision was effective, that whenever a Federal
regulatory body established a scheduled of hours for any industry,
our Department of Labor and Industry is bound to adopt such
schedule of hours for that industry. This would of course intro-
duce an inequality in the requirement for hours of labor in Penn-
sylvania. There is no pretense that the Federal schedule will be
limited by any standard. In this attempted transfer of legislative
power there is not even the semblance of limitation or control. A
more sweeping abdication of power and duty would be difficult to
imagine.
A Florida statute was declared unconstitutional as an improper dele-
gation of legislative power in Hutchins v. Mayo." The statute provided that
citrus fruit be graded "according to standards as now fixed by the United
States Department of Agriculture or as such standards be hereafter modi-
fied or changed." The Supreme Court of Florida said: "We cannot ac-
cept the view that the estate commission may make binding rules to be
promulgated by the federal bureau in the future. That is a delegation of
a delegated power which we cannot sanction."
Another Florida statute, in defining the word "employer" for pur-
poses of industrial compensation laws, excluded any employer, employ-
ment, or service which is not included within Title IX of the Federal Social
Security Act, or amendments thereto. The court felt that it was within
1In re Opinion of Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 133 N.E. 453 (1921).
"331 Pa. 255, 200 Atl. 672, 117 A.L.R. 639 (1938)."143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495, 133 A.L.R. 394 (1940).
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the Legislature's province to approve or disapprove administrative inter-
pretations of a state or federal act that was in effect at the time the Legis-
lature acted, but it is not competent for the Legislature to approve admin-
istrative interpretations of an act of another state or of the federal gov-
ernment to be promulgated in the future. The court considered the ques-
tion "academic."
In City of Cleveland v. Piskura,' a municipal ordinance of Cleveland,
Ohio, provided that it was an offense against the city to violate the Emer-
gency Price Control Act of the federal government. This ordinance was
held to be an unlawful attempt by the city to delegate power to a federal
agency. But New York upheld a similar state statute on the theory that
it does not delegate power to the federal government inasmuch as the Of-
fice of Price Administration already had power to act in price regulation
violation. The mere adding of the city's enforcement to the federal law
does not empower the federal agency to change existing state law."
Many courts have upheld state statutes which adopt federal stand-
ards and regulations, but most of these can be distinguished from the cases
previously referred to on the ground that they authorize the mere filling
in of details.
In California, one Lasswell was accused of cleaning a woman's dress
for fifty cents and a man's hat for the same amount in violation of a state
code of fair competition regulating the cleaning and dyeing industry. It
was contended that the act which Lasswell had violated was an unconstitu-
tional delegation by the State of California to the federal government. It
was charged that the California National Industrial Recovery Act, called
the "Little NRA," adopted the federal National Recovery Act. But the
California statute was upheld, the court saying, "there must be an over-
lying law which constitutes the primary standard. The function of the
delegated power must be to 'determine some fact or state of things upon
which the enforcement of the primary standard law depends.' " The court
found nothing improper in the "filling in of details" by the federal gov-
ernment although stressing that the "correlative rights of state and nation
are of great importance."'
The California Alien Land Law was likewise upheld against the same
charge as in the Lasswell case. The court held that the law does not un-
constitutionally delegate authority merely because of the fact that the state
Legislature has set up rules of eligibility to citizenship under the laws of
the United States as a primary standard.'
An Arizona statute provided that no veteran entitled to the benefits
under Servicemen's Readjustment Act shall be under legal disability by
reason of minority to make any contract involving such benefits.' The
statute was held not to be an unconstitutional delegation of essential legis-
lative power to the United States Veteran's Administrator, since only mat-
ters of detail are left to the administrator.
Statutes have recently been upheld which authorize administrators
or commissioners to adopt rules later to be promulgated by a foreign state
'p145 Ohio St. 144, 60 N.E.2d 919 (1945).
'Mosher v. Haddock, 181 Misc. 486, 46 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1944).
'In re Lasswell, 1 Cal. App. 2d 183, 36 P.2d 678 (1934).
'People v. Oyama, 29 Cal. 2d 164, 173 P.2d 794 (1946).
"Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 62 Ariz. 538, 159 P.2d 292 (1945).
[Vol. 17,
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or even a non-political organization?' The adoption by the Texas legisla-
ture of standards theretofore prescribed by the National Board of Under-
writers for safe handling of liquefied petroleum gases according to a docu-
ment on file, was held not to be rendered invalid by further provision in
the statute authorizing the Railroad Commission to aodpt and promulgate
such regulations as might be thereafter adopted and published by the Na-
tional Board of Fire Underwriters or National Fire Protection Associa-
tion, neither of which was a governmental agency.' An Ohio statute em-
powered building and loan associations to convert into federal savings and
loan associations and imposed conditions and limitations on the exercise
of that power, such as the requirement of compliance with federal laws and
regulations of federal agencies. It was held that the statute did not dele-
gate legislative power." These cases may be distinguished from other cases
considered for the reason that the statutes did not imperatively command
or prohibit the performance of acts but only authorized or permitted them.
Courts which, in early decisions, spoke in prohibitory terms with
reference to delegations of legislative power, now agree that some dele-
gations are permissible so long as they are accompanied by sufficient
basic standards. The "exigencies of modern government" dictate the use
of general rather than minutely detailed standards. ' Delegations "must
be judged in the light of what is practical."' In a 1955 New Jersey case,
State v. Hotel Bar Foods," the court was called upon to determine the con-
stitutionality of the Packaging Food Law of that state. It was pointed
out that New Jersey courts had in the past approved statutory authoriza-
tion to adopt the rules and regulations which "shall be kept in conformity
as nearly as may be with the laws, rules, and regulations of the United
States government concerning aeronautics." Similarly, it approved the
statutory direction to "cooperate to the fullest extent consistent with the
provisions of the Social Security Board of the federal government."
Statutes had also been upheld, the court pointed out, which directed the
State Department of Health to follow the rules "from time to time pro-
mulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States under the
federal act." The Packaging Food Law under attack forbade any person
to have in possession for sale "any article of food in package form unless
marked thereon with the weight, measure or numerical count, provided
that reasonable variations in small packages shall be permitted and that
the state superintendent shall fix "such tolerances and exceptions as to
small packages as shall be fixed by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Sec-
retary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Commerce of the United
States."
"For cases in which states have upheld laws adopting federal standards which are
designed to augment the enforcement of federal laws and regulations, see Transit
Commision v. Long Island R. Co., 272 N.Y. 27, 3 N.E.2d 622 (1936) ; Smith v. Alphin,
150 N.C. 425, 64 N.E. 210 (1902) ; Cleveland Macaroni v. State Board of Health of
California, D.C., 256 F. 376 (1919) and Note, 33 MieH. L. REv. 597 (1934-35).
Dudding v. Automatic Gas Co., 145 Tex. 1, 193 S.W.2d 517 (1946).
"Opdyke v. Security Savings & Loan Co., 157 Ohio St. 121, 105 N.E.2d 9 (1952).
'State Board of Milk Control v. Neward Milk Co., 118 N.J.Eq. 504, 179 Atl. 116
(1935) ; New Jersey Bell Telephone Co4 v. Communications Workers, 5 N.J. 354, 75
A.2d 721 (1950) ; Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 93 A.2d 385 (1952).
'Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1950).
2918 N.J. 115, 112 A.2d 726 (1955).
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In approving of this entire line of cases, the court said:
Realistically viewed, the distinction seems insubstantial and
hardly sufficient to determine basic issues of constitutionality.
The ultimate and controlling policy decision-as to whether there
shall be uniformity of Federal-State regulation in this field-rests
always with the Legislature and it does not in any vicious sense
abdicate its judgment or authority.
The 1955 amendment to the Montana income tax laws is not entirely
novel in the United States. New Hampshire, in 1955, considered passing
a similar law and the state supreme court was asked for an advisory opin-
ion as to the constitutionality.' The court declared that it was beyond
the legislative authority to enact such a law, but it was on constitutional
grounds which are not applicable in Montana.' In 1954, Kentucky passed
a law' incorporating into the state law the applicable sections of the fed-
eral code, but prospective amendments were not included. Georgia had a
law' similar to the 1954 Kentucky statute as early as 1929. The Corporate
Franchise Tax Law of Pennsylvania provided that the tax will be a fixed
percentage of the amount reported to the federal government as taxable
income. In 1952, the constitutionality of the law was challenged." At the
outset the court distinguished this tax, an excise tax on the privilege of
doing business within the state, from a graduated income tax, saying: "If
the legislature had the constitutional right to levy a graduated income tax
and should provide that it should be the same as fixed by the Federal gov-
ermnent, then we would have a situation such as the appellant contends..."
is a delegation of legislative power. The court thought that Holgate Co. v.
Bashore, supra, supported their position rather than that of the appellants,
adding that the Holgate case "would be an analogue, if an income tax
statute had been passed, similar to such as the Federal Legislature might
enact, which, as before pointed out, is not the case." Although dicta, the
statements clearly reveal the reluctance of the Pennsylvania court to ap-
prove an income tax based upon the federal method of computation, includ-
ing future changes.
On the other hand, in the face of cases such as those discussed above,
the income tax law of Alaska was upheld by the ninth circuit court in
Alaska Steamship Co v. Mullaney.' The territory income tax was set at
10% of the amount paid the federal government in the previous year. The
court, speaking through Judge Pope, recognized the right to incorporate
by reference provisions of the federal law "now in effect" as beyond ques-
tion. In regard to the effect of amendments to the federal law, the court
said:
We do not overlook the fact that if the words "or hereafter
amended" were dropped from the Act, what remains would, in the
long run, be unworkable under the legislative scheme here devised,
for if the Federal income tax requirements were changed sub-
'In re Opinion of Justices, 99 N.H. 527, 113 A.2d 548 (1955).
'The constitution of New Hampshire forbids a graduated income tax; Montana has
no such limitation.
'KEN. REV. STAT. § 141.010.9 ( ........
mee Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930).
"Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theatres, 345 Pa. 270, 27 A.2d 63 (1942).
1180 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1950).
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stantially by future amendments, it would be impossible adminis-
tratively, to calculate the Alaska income tax merely by dividing
the tax shown on the federal return by 10. That is a hypothetical
question that conceivably may never arise.
We think it far from clear that any invalid delegation is at-
tempted. There are of course many cases which have held at-
tempts by a legislative body to incorporate provisions into its en-
actment by reference to other acts or amendments by other legis-
latures, to be invalid. But where it can be said that the attempt
to make the local law conform to future changes elsewhere is not
a mere labor-saving device for the legislators, but is undertaken
in order to attain a uniformity which is in itself an important ob-
ject of the proposed legislative scheme, there are a number of
precedents for approval of this sort of thing. Reciprocal and re-
taliatory legislation falls into this category.
Much credit is due Judge Pope's persuasive argument. Indeed, this
is the kind of legislation that has long been desired by accountants and tax
consultants who discover the necessity of "keeping two sets of books" for
state and federal income tax purposes to record minor differences in com-
puting the tax for two separate governments taxing substantially the
same income." The simplicity of filing a return under the amended law
in Montana is evidence of merit of the law. Although this type of law
may be desirable by reason of its operational simplicity, the question of
constitutionality is more difficult to answer. It should be noted that in
the Alaska Steamship case, the court did not consider the effect of the
line of cases discussed in this paper. The matter was apparently set at
rest in an earlier case ' involving the same taxpayer, so that those cases
were not urged upon the court for consideration. In the former case, the
appellant (taxpayer) was prepared with an imposing volume of author-
ity to sustain his argument that the statute was a delegation of legislfa-
tive power. The court there was convinced that the weight of numerical
authority supported the position of the appellant and would, if deemed
controlling, preclude the territory from availing itself of the advantage
to be gained from adopting the federal method of computation of the
tax. But counsel for the appellant "scratched up a snake ' by citing
In re Lasswell, supra, in support of his position. This seemed enough to
satisfy the court that the statute, even with its prospective amendments,
was valid. The Lasswell case, the court said, was the better rule. But
,this was only dicta in the decision since, at that time, there had been no
changes in the federal code after the enactment of the territory income
tax law. The appellant was not in a position to complain until such time
as the federal law was amended.
In the second Alaksa Steamship case, the court referred to "a number
"See Kassell, No Uniformity in State Income Taxes-lVhy? 87 J. Accountancy 293
(1949).
'Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, 84 F. Snpp. 561 (9th Cir. 1949). The petitioner
relied on: In re Lasswell, 1 Cal. App. 2d 183, 36 P.2d 678 (1934) ; Florida Commis-
sion v. State, 155 Fla. 772, 21 So. 2d 599 (1945) ; Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga.
370, 153 S.E. 58 (1930) ; In re Opinion of Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 133 N.E. 453
(1921) ; State v. Weber, 125 Me. 319, 133 Ad. 738 (1926) ; Santee Mills v. Query,
122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922).
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of precedents for approval of this sort of thing" and included reciprocal
and retaliatory legislation as among those. It is difficult to see how there
is any real similarity.' The power to tax is neither reciprocal nor retalia-
tory, but a separate incident of each sovereignty to finance its operation and
continue its existence. The Territory of Alaska, of course, has no separate
sovereign entity, but the court did not regard this factor as controlling the
question of whether or not the territorial legislature might be delegating its
power to the federal government. To the extent that this factor should be
found to be controlling, the cases construing a territorial statute would seem
to be, to the same extent, less authoritative in a decision concerning the con-
stitutionality of a state statute. But, in any event, it will be interesting to
note how the ninth circuit handles the question when a case arises after
changes in the federal code which have not, as existing law, been incorpo-
rated by reference into the law of the territory.
It would seem that Montana is free to decide this question either against
or in favor of upholding the tax statute, depending upon which line of
authority the courts should deem desirable. Is there in any real sense an
abdication of the essential legislative powers of the legislature? It may be
forcibly argued that there is not.
To begin with, there is a basic standard, the federal law, which it itself
confined within the limits of the definition of the term "income."' 0 Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co." condemned the Tax Act of 1894 as repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against direct taxes which were not appor-
tioned among the several states according to population. To the extent that
income subject to the tax included income from property, the tax was held
to be a tax on property, and was therefore a direct tax according to tradi-
tional constitutional dogma. The Sixteenth Amendment to the federal Con-
stitution, which was passed to countermand the effect of the Pollock case,
specifically authorized taxation on incomes without the requirement of ap-
portionment among the states, but made no changes in other direct taxes.
There remains, therefore, a stringent limitation on the power of Congress to
expand the coverage of an income tax. Can it not be argued that Montana,
in adopting the definition of "gross income" and "deductions'" are merely
delegating to the federal government the power to "fill in the details?" A
contrary determination might indeed be to "exault the form before the sub-
stance" and allow insubstantial technicalities to impinge unnecessarily upon
the flexibility so necessary in a modern government.
Realistically considered, the real dangers of this type of legislation are
practically non-existent. If the federal government should amend or inter-
pret the Internal Revenue Code in a manner unsatisfactory to the Montana
legislature, then the legislature may at any time amend the state law to re-
move the undesired changes.
'Reciprocal legislation of a state (particularly with reference to inheritance taxa-
tion) and retaliatory legislation (common with reference to regulation of insur-
ance) may depend, for their effectiveness, upon the future legislative action of other
jurisdictions, but are generally recognizd as valid. See People v. Fire Ass'n of
Philadelphia, 92 N.Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380 (1883).
For an interesting comment on reciprocal and retaliatory legislation, see. Starr,
Recriprocal aii4 Retaliatory Legislation in the United State8, 21 MINN. L. REV. 371
(1937). See also 57 YAT, L. J. 201 (1947).
"Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920).
"157 U.S. 429, 15 S.Ct. 673, 39 L.Ed. 759 (1895)
8
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What will be the effect on the balance of the law, if the Supreme Court
of Montana should strike down the portion of the law which incorporates
the future amendments of the federal code? There is adequate authority to
support the conclusion that the remainder will be valid standing alone.
In considering the validity of a statute, we have the benefit of a pre-
sumption of constitutionality." Every reasonable doubt will be resolved in
favor of validity.' Where a statute is attacked as unconstitutional, the ques-
tion to be answered is not whether it is possible to condemn it, but whether
it is possible to uphold it." Where the language of a statute is susceptible of
two constructions, the court will adopt the one which avoids injustice, hard-
ship, constitutional doubts or other objectional results.' The same presump-
tion obtains against delegations of power by the legislature." Montana
courts have placed themselves squarely on record in support of these general
theorums of law. "A court cannot assume that the Legislature intended to
do an unlawful act or pass an unconstitutional bill." "'
In Montana, the presumption of validity applies to the remainder of a
statute after the objectional part has been stricken out, if the remainder is
complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with the ap-
parent legislative intent, and the approval of the invalid portion was not
an inducement to the enactment of those remaining." In late cases, the
Montana court has spoken in mandatory language, that the statute "must"
be upheld if it is possible to eliminate the invalid portion without destroying
the whole statute."
Some cases in other jurisdictions have declared that the presumption of
inseverability will be indulged in unless there is a "savings clause" clearly
setting forth the intention of the legislature that if "any portion of the
statute should be subsequently declared unconstitutional, the remainder
shall stand." In the much-cited case of Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of
Louisiana,' the court said that in the absence of a legislative declaration that
invalid portions shall not affect the remainder, the presumption is that the
legislature intended the act to be effective as an entity. From that case we
have this pronouncement:
The effect of the statutory declaration is to create, in place of
the presumption just stated, the opposite one of separability. That
is to say, we begin in the light of the declaration, with the presump-
tion that the legislature intended the act to be divisible; and this
presumption must be overcome by considerations which make evi-
dent the inseparability of its provisions, or the clear probability
that, the invalid part being eliminated, the legislature would not
have been satisfied with what remains.
The effect of the savings clause thus seems to be to change the presump-
tion from inseverability to severability. The legislature of Montana
4Arps v. State Highway Commission, 90 Mont. 152, 300 Pac. 549 (1931).
"In re Mosmain Drainage Dist., 90 Mont. 1, 300 Pac. 280 (1931).
"Arps v. State Highway Commission, 90 Mont. 152, 300 Pac. 549 (1931).
"Hill v. Board of Education, 207 Misc. 736, 140 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1955).
"Town of Mamaroneck v. New York Interurban Water Co., 212 N.Y.Supp. 639 (Spec.
Term 1925).
'7Couch v. Chase, 91 Mont. 234, 6 P.2d 867 (1932).
'Hamilton v. County Commissioners, 54 Mont. 301, 169 Pac. 729 (1917).
"Gullickson v. Mitchell, 113 Mont. 359, 126 P.2d 1106 (1942).
"278 U.S. 235, 73 L.Ed. 287, 49 Sup.Ct. 115, 60 A.L.R. 596 (1929).
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thoughtfully added such a clause to the 1955 amendment to the income tax
statutes." While it seems clear, from what has already been said, that the
valid portions of the statute will stand alone without a savings clause, the
addition of such a clause should eliminate all doubt. It is the final mani-
festation of the legislative intent on the question of severability.'
It may be said that the intended effect of the amendment has been
substantially accomplished, even if the phrase incorporating the prospec-
tive federal changes is declared to be invalid. But, as pointed out by Judge
Pope in the Alaska Steamship case, supra, in order for the law to be fully
effective, that phrase must be included.' Since the Montana legislature
convenes only once every two years, the interim revisions in the federal
code cannot currently be included in the Montana law, unless it remains
as it was written.
TOM HENDRICKS
NEED FOR A REPLACEMENT STATUTE TO
CORRECT EXISTING INEQUITIES
Suppose Mr. A. B. White, a business man, and Mr. C. D. Black, a
rancher, had both died the same day, each leaving an estate valued at
$60,000. If you were the widow of Mr. Black, would you expect to receive
the same amount of inheritance as Mrs. White? You probably would, espe-
cially if you had the same number of children and your husband owed no
more debts than Mr. White. You can also imagine Mrs. Black's surprise
when the court awarded her a life interest in $16,667 and $5,000 outright
as her share, while Mrs. White received $30,000.
How could the same court arrive at such divergent amounts? The
answer to this question requires an analysis of the assets of the two estates.
Mr. White, the business man, lived in a rented house which he furnished
himself. The furniture, appliances, and personal effects were valued at
$5,000. He owned an automobile with a market value of $3,000, and his
bank blance read $2,000 when he died. The shares of stock which he held,
had a value of $50,000. This gave Mr. White an estate of $60,000. Mr.
Black's estate reached the same total. The land and buildings on his ranch
were worth $50,000. ' He had a pickup and a tractor, each worth about
$1,500. The livestock was quoted at $4,000. Mr. Black had $2,000 in per-
sonal effects and $1,000 in the bank.
"Section 84-4941 reads: If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of this
act is for any reason held to be unconstitutional or invalid, such decision shall not
affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act.
'Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66 L. Ed. 822, 42 Sup. Ct. 456 (1922).
"It should be noted that there are certain distinct differences between the Alaska
and Montana laws. The Alaska law requires the payment of a certain percentage of
the tax paid to the federal government, whereas the Montana law merely includes
the definitions of income and deductions. The tax rate is set by the Montana
statutes; only the income subject to the tax Is subject to variation by prospective
federal enactments. The Alaska tax could not be effectively administered without
inclusion of current federal changes, since it would otherwise be necessary to recom-
pute the federal tax to eliminate the effect of federal changes which had not become
a part of the Alaska law, before applying the fixed percentage. On the other hand,
the exclusion of current federal changes from the Montana law would not have so
harsh an effect, since it is already necessary to make a recomputation to allow for
additions and exclusions from income referred to in note 2 supra,
[Vol. 17,
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 17 [1955], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol17/iss2/6
